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NO IMPLIED EFFECT: THE “SAFE” FCC CELL PHONE
RADIATION STANDARD AND
TORT IMMUNITY BY IMPLIED CONFLICT PREEMPTION
By Sean M. Sherman*
Cite as: Sean M. Sherman, No Implied Effect: The “Safe”  FCC Cell
Phone Radiation Standard and Tort Immunity by Implied Conflict
Preemption, 19 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 13 (2013), available at
http://jolt.richmond.edu/v19i4/article13.pdf.
I. INTRODUCTION
[1] Cell phones emit low-level radiation.1 Constantly.2
[2] From 1992 to 1998, Dr. Christopher Newman used his cell phone
for nearly 350 hours—about ten minutes per day.3 When he developed a
tumor on the side of his head where he used his cell phone, Dr. Newman
sued various cell phone manufacturers, claiming that his exposure to
* J.D., The George Washington University Law School, 2012; B.A., University of
Pennsylvania, 2009.  Law Clerk to the Honorable John G. Koeltl, United States District
Judge for the Southern District of New York.  Many thanks to my family and friends,
without whose love and support I would be lost; to Professors Alan Morrison and Roger
Schechter for providing invaluable advice on life, and on this article; and to Rachel
Lockwood, for her constant support and for helping me to realize that my worrying over
the effects of cell phones could be harnessed constructively.
1 See Guidelines for Evaluating the Envtl. Effects of Radiofrequency Radiation, 11 FCC
Rcd. 15123, 15135, 15146–47 (1996) [hereinafter FCC First Order].
2 See Tara Parker-Pope, How Much Radiation Does Your Phone Emit? , WELL N.Y.
TIMES (June 11, 2008, 3:31 PM), http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/06/11/how-much-
radiation-does-your-phone-emit/.
3 Newman v. Motorola, Inc., 78 F. App’x 292, 293 (4th Cir. 2003).
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consistent low-level radiation had caused his brain cancer.4 Although his
case was dismissed for an inability to prove that his cell phone exposure
had caused his tumor,5 had Dr. Newman attempted his lawsuit today, it is
unlikely that his case would have progressed past the initial complaint.6
So long as Dr. Newman’s cell phone complied with the Federal
Communication Commission’s (“FCC”) standard for a “safe” level of
radiation, he would have been barred from claiming that the cell phone
caused or contributed to his injury.7 However, it is far from clear that the
FCC standard is actually safe.8
[3] In the past decade, people claiming to have been injured from
prolonged exposure to cell phones have brought tort suits alleging that cell
phone manufacturers are not adequately warning or protecting customers
from the dangerous side effects of their products.9 While the scientific
community is divided over whether cell phones are safe,10 two out of the
three appeals courts that have addressed the issue have held that so long as
cell phones comply with the FCC’s standard, tort suits against cell phone
companies are barred by implied conflict preemption.11 Alternatively, one
4 See id. at 293-94.
5 See id.
6 See Murray v. Motorola, Inc., 982 A.2d 764, 768 (D.C. 2009); Farina v. Nokia, Inc.,
625 F.3d 97, 104 (3d Cir. 2010).
7 See Murray, 982 A.2d at 777-78; Farina, 625 F.3d at 125.
8 See infra Part II.C.
9 See infra Part III.B.
10 See infra Part II.C.
11 See infra Part III.B.2 When federal law and state law conflict, the Supremacy Clause
requires that the state law be superseded. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
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court of appeals has held that such suits are not barred by the FCC
standard.12
[4] This Article argues that under the proper application of the
doctrine of implied conflict preemption, state tort lawsuits against cell
phone makers should not be barred by the FCC standard.13 Lower courts
should allow these suits to advance in accordance with Supreme Court
precedent, or if necessary, the Supreme Court should grant certiorari and
resolve the current circuit split.14 Allowing these suits to proceed will lead
to safer phones because cell phone manufacturers will adopt an efficient
level of precaution to avoid liability, rather than continuing to hide behind
the “safe” FCC standard.15 While there should be a presumption of safety
for phones that abide by the FCC standard, that presumption should be
tested in litigation, especially as the evidence indicating serious health
risks continues to grow.16
[5] Part II of this Article will provide the factual background
underlying the current scientific debate over cell phone radiation and the
FCC response.  Part III will discuss the legal framework for the conflict
preemption of state tort suits and the current circuit split over preempting
tort suits against cell phone makers.  Part IV will argue that according to
the legislative history, Supreme Court doctrine, and policy rationales, state
tort suits against cell phone manufacturers should not be barred by the
12 Pinney v. Nokia, Inc., 402 F.3d 430, 439 (4th Cir. 2005); See infra Part III.B.1.
13 See infra Part IV.
14 The Supreme Court denied the Farina plaintiff’s petition for a writ of certiorari. See
Farina v. Nokia, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 365 (2011).
15 See infra Part IV.
16 See infra Part II.C.
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FCC standard.  Part V will address potential counterarguments against
allowing the suits to go forward.
II. CELL PHONE RADIATION, THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE,
AND THE RISE OF THE FCC STANDARD
[6] Worldwide, scientists vigorously debate whether long-term
exposure to low-level radiation from cell phones increases health risks in
humans.17 In 1996, the FCC adopted a standard to govern the maximum
level of admissible radiation called the specific absorption rate (“SAR”)—
the rate at which radiation is absorbed into tissue.18 While the SAR
standard took into account the “thermal effects” of cell phones (literally
the amount of heat they give off to avoid burning), the FCC purposely
excluded from its SAR calculations the potential non-thermal effects from
prolonged exposure (cancer, tumors, etc.) due to a lack of scientific
evidence.
[7] This section details the rise of the FCC’s regulation of cell phone
radiation, culminating in the reaffirmation of the 1996 FCC SAR standard
in 1997.19 Although cell phone makers and the FCC now claim that the
SAR standard bars tort suits, the FCC itself explicitly and repeatedly
decried any preemptive power of the SAR standard when the FCC first
promulgated it.20
[8] While the SAR standard has remained unchanged since 1996,
research into the non-thermal biological effects of cell phone radiation has
17 See id.
18 See FCC First Order, supra note 1, at 15147.
19 Radiofrequency Radiation Exposure Evaluation: Portable Devices, 47 C.F.R. §
2.1093(d) (2012).
20 See infra Part II.A.2.
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grown exponentially.21 In response to the mounting evidence of the risks
associated with prolonged exposure, a handful of developed countries
have taken significant action to curb the potential adverse effects of cell
phone radiation, especially on children.22 The United States has not only
kept its SAR standard at the 1996 level, but the courts, at the urging of the
FCC, have barred plaintiffs from addressing the possibility of non-thermal
effects through the invocation of implied conflict preemption.23
A. The Rise of the FCC SAR Standard
[9] In 1993, when there were only approximately thirteen million cell
phone users in the United States,24 worries emerged about the dangers of
phone radiation exposure.25 In response, the FCC claimed the authority,
pursuant to its interpretation of both the National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969 (“NEPA”)26 and the Telecommunications Act of 1996
(“TCA”), to regulate cell phone radiation.27 Despite promulgating
21 See infra Part II.B.
22 See infra text accompanying notes 91-100.
23 See Farina v. Nokia, Inc., 625 F.3d 97, 105 (3d Cir. 2010); Murray v. Motorola, Inc.,
982 A.2d 764, 767 (D.C. 2009); infra Part III.B.2.
24 Semi-Annual Mid-Year 2012 Wireless Industry Survey, CTIA: THE WIRELESS ASS’N 2
(2012), http://files.ctia.org/pdf/CTIA_Survey_MY_2012_Graphics-_final.pdf.
25 See Guidelines for Evaluating the Envtl. Effects of Radiofrequency Radiation, 8 FCC
Rcd. 2849, 2850–51 (1993).
26 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4332(C) (2006).
27 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104 § 704(a), 110 Stat. 151 (1996)
(codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 332(c) (2006)). While it might seem that the task of
regulation of radiation from cell phones would be better suited to the scientific expertise
of the Food and Drug Administration, Environmental Protection Agency or the Consumer
Product Safety Commission, none of these agencies attempted to regulate cell phone
radiation.
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regulations in the area of cell phone radiation, the FCC and the statutes
granting it regulatory authority explicitly stated that the regulations would
not preempt state and local lawsuits.28 Nonetheless, preemption of state
and local lawsuits is exactly what has ensued.29
1. The Authority of the FCC Under the NEPA and the
TCA to Regulate Cell Phone Radiation Levels
[10] The Federal Communications Act of 193430 established the FCC
and endowed the agency with broad authority to regulate radio
communications.31 The FCC’s regulations of cell phone radiation
emissions arose from the combined mandates of the NEPA32 and the
TCA.33 In 1985, in response to the mandate of the NEPA,34 the FCC
concluded that it was obligated to regulate radiofrequency radiation
standards.35 After seeking input from other federal agencies and interested
28 See infra Part II.A.2.
29 See infra Part III.B.
30 Federal Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2006).
31 See Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 214–15 (1943).
32 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2006).
33 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104 § 704(a), 110 Stat. 151 (1996)
(codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 332(c) (2006)).
34 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (requiring that all federal agencies must identify and consider the
environmental impact of any “major” action that “significantly affect[s] the quality of the
human environment”).
35 The FCC admitted that although it does not possess agency expertise with respect to
the development of public health and safety standards, the NEPA obligated it to regulate
the radiofrequency radiation standards. See Responsibility of the Fed. Commc’ns
Comm’n to Consider Biological Effects of Radiofrequency Radiation When Authorizing
the Use of Radiofrequency Devices, 100 F.C.C.2d 543, 546, 551 (1985).
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parties, the FCC adopted the then current American National Standards
Institute Committee (“ANSI”) standard governing radiofrequency
emissions as its own.36 These regulations did not extend to cell phones.37
[11] In 1993, prompted by ANSI’s revision of its standards in
collaboration with the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers, Inc.
(“IEEE”), the FCC began rulemaking procedures to determine whether it
should strengthen its regulations.38 Among the proposed changes was the
extension of radiofrequency regulations to cover cell phones.39 During the
pendency of the notice and comment period, Congress passed the TCA,40
which directed the FCC to “make effective rules regarding the
environmental effects of radiofrequency emissions” within 180 days.41
[12] In response to both the TCA’s mandate and the NEPA,42 the FCC
adopted a hybrid of the ANSI/IEEE standard43 and limited radiofrequency
emissions from cell phones for the first time.44 In particular, the 1996
36 Id. at 551.
37 See id. at 561.
38 See Guidelines for Evaluating the Envtl. Effects of Radiofrequency Radiation, 8 FCC
Rcd. 2849, 2849–51 (1993).
39 Id. at 2851.
40 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, (1996) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C. (2006)).
41 See id. at § 704(b), 110 Stat. 152, (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iv)
(2006)).
42 See FCC First Order, supra note 1, at 15125.
43 See id. at 15134–35, 15146–47.
44 See id. at 15146–47.
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume XIX, Issue 4
8
FCC First Order adopted a maximum SAR of 1.6 W/kg.45 After the FCC
announced the 1996 SAR standard, the agency received many petitions for
reconsideration.46 The petitioners alleged that the FCC had not, among
other things, considered non-thermal effects of prolonged radiation
exposure or the possibly larger impact of the SAR on children’s
developing nervous systems.47
[13] Despite petitions for reconsideration, the FCC reaffirmed the 1.6
W/kg SAR standard in the 1997 FCC Second Order.48 The FCC Second
Order dismissed criticisms of the FCC methodology in the FCC First
Order, stating, “the issue of non-thermal effects was explicitly addressed
in the 1992 ANSI/IEEE standard, which concluded that no reliable
scientific data exist to indicate such effects may be meaningfully related to
human health.”49 In adopting the ANSI/IEEE standard as its own, the
FCC essentially reasoned that Americans need not be protected against
health effects that have not been clearly established.50 The FCC SAR
45 See id. at 15148.
46 See Procedures for Reviewing Requests for Relief From State and Local Regulations,
12 FCC Rcd. 13494, 13496-98 (1997) [hereinafter FCC Second Order].
47 See Reply Brief for Petitioner Cellular Phone Taskforce, FCC First Order, 11 FCC
Rcd. 15123 (1996) (No. 98-4122) 1998 WL 34097633 at *20, *29, *33-34.
48 FCC Second Order, supra note 46, at 13505.
49 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
50 See Carol R. Goforth, A Bad Call: Preemption of State and Local Authority to Regulate
Wireless Communication Facilities on the Basis of Radiofrequency Emissions, 44 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 311, 357 (2001).
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standard has not changed since 1997.51 All cell phones sold in the United
States today must comply with the 1997 FCC SAR standard.52
2. The Preemptive Effects of the FCC’s SAR Standard
[14] Today in some circuits, tort suits against cell phone manufacturers
are barred by preemption.53 The FCC did not originally intend for its 1996
FCC First Order or 1997 FCC Second Order to preempt state laws
regarding radiofrequency radiation.54 In contrast, the Federal
Communications Act of 1934, the TCA, the FCC First Order, and the
FCC Second Order each specifically disclaimed preemptive power over
state laws.55
[15] The Federal Communications Act contains a saving clause56 which
provides that “[n]othing contained in this chapter shall in any way abridge
or alter the remedies now existing at common law or by statute . . . .”57
51 Compare Guidelines for Evaluating the Environmental Effects of Radiofrequency
Radiation, 62 Fed. Reg. 47960, 47967 (Sept. 12, 1997), with Radiofrequency Radiation
Exposure Evaluation: Portable Devices, 47 C.F.R. § 2.1093(d) (2013).
52 See Marketing of Radio Frequency Devices Prior to Equipment Authorization, 47
C.F.R. §§ 2.803(a)(1); Equipment Authorization, 47 C.F.R. §§ 24.51–.52 (2013).
53 See infra Part III.A-B.
54 See FCC Second Order, supra note 46, at 13529.
55 See infra text accompanying notes 56-71.
56 A “saving clause” in the preemption context is a clause in a statute that qualifies the
breadth of the statute.  The clause is meant to signal the legislature’s intent to prevent the
statute from preempting areas of state law that it is not intended to supersede.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has stated that “the saving clause (like the express pre-
emption provision) does not bar the ordinary working of conflict preemption principles.”
Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 869 (2000).
57 Federal Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 414 (2006).
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Similarly, although the TCA included express preemption provisions that
expanded the FCC’s authority to preempt certain state and local
regulations regarding the placement of wireless service facilities,58 it did
not preempt state tort suits stemming from radiofrequency radiation
exposure or state laws regarding health and safety.59
[16] The TCA’s preemption of state laws regarding the placement of
“facilities” paralleled one of the premier goals of the statute: to ensure the
development and availability of a nationwide infrastructure for wireless
services.60 The TCA saving clause, entitled “[n]o implied effect,” makes
it clear that the legislation does not preempt any state legislation except
those state laws explicitly regarding “facilities.”61
[17] The FCC specifically addressed whether its radiation standards had
preemptive effects under the TCA in the 1996 FCC First Order and
confirmed that the preemption clause only applied to those laws regulating
the placement of wireless facilities.62 Explaining its decision not to
preempt state laws regarding radiofrequency exposure, the FCC noted that
“[w]e have traditionally been reluctant to preempt state or local
regulations enacted to promote bona fide health and safety objectives.”63
58 See Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(A) (2006).
59 See id. at § 332(c)(7)(B)(iv-v).
60 See id. § 151; see also Pinney v. Nokia, Inc., 402 F.3d 430, 457 (4th Cir. 2005).
61 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104 § 601(c)(1), 110 Stat. 143-44
(1996) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 152 (2006)) (stating that the statute “shall not be
construed to modify, impair, or supersede Federal, State, or local law unless expressly so
provided ”).
62 See FCC First Order, supra note 1, at 15183-84.
63 Id.
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[18] The 1996 FCC First Order pointed to the TCA’s preemption of
only state and local regulations regarding “facilities” to support the FCC’s
decision not to preempt state regulations outside of the “facilities”
context.64 Finally, the FCC indicated in the FCC First Order that if in the
future cell phone manufacturers felt that state radiofrequency laws should
be preempted the proper approach to obtain such preemption would be to
petition the FCC for a rule change.65 Thus, in the FCC First Order, the
FCC not only refused to preempt state laws regarding radiofrequency
exposure limits, but also laid out a specific mechanistic approach to how
such preemption should be adopted in the future if necessary.66
[19] In the 1997 FCC Second Order, the agency addressed the
preemption argument a second time and again refused to preempt outside
of the specific “facilities” confine of the TCA.67 Proponents of
preemption argued that the FCC should preempt state laws regarding all
radiofrequency transmitters,68 or in the alternative, “establish a federal
‘rule of liability’ for torts related to the environmental effects of
radiofrequency emissions so that licensees can avoid ‘unnecessary and
conflicting’ lawsuits.”69 The FCC denied both requests and reaffirmed its
64 See id. at 15183.
65 See id. at 15184 (stating that, “should FCC licensees encounter a pattern of state or
local activities which constitute an obstacle to the scheme of federal control of radio
facilities set forth in the Communications Act, they should present us with such evidence
as well as their view of the legal basis which could justify FCC preemption of state and
local ordinances. At this time however, we deny the petitions . . . requesting a broad-
based preemption policy to cover all transmitting sources”).
66 See id.
67 See FCC Second Order, supra note 46, at 13529.
68 See id. at 13525-26.
69 See id. at 13527.
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FCC First Order.70 The FCC refused to preempt state tort suits because of
the language in the TCA and disregarded requests for a federal rule of
liability because tellingly, it questioned “whether such an action, which
would preempt too broad a scope of legal actions, would otherwise be
appropriate.”71 Since the 1997 FCC Second Order, the FCC has not
officially addressed the preemption question, nor have any licensees taken
up the FCC’s proffered official process for requesting preemption of state
laws.72
B. The Scientific Debate Over Non-Thermal Biological Effects
[20] While there is no dispositive data on whether cell phones cause
long-term health problems, the evidence of adverse effects has steadily
increased since the first enactment of the SAR standard.  In 1997, when
the SAR standard was last reaffirmed, cell phones were a relatively new
phenomenon.73 Because cell phones had not been in common usage for a
long period of time, the research into the non-thermal biological effects of
low levels of radiation was based primarily on short-term data.74 In the
70 See id. at 13529.
71 See id.
72 The FCC filed an amicus brief in Murray v. Motorola, Inc., however it did not follow
its procedures for preemption as outlined in the FCC First Order and it is debatable
whether an official agency position can first be asserted in an amicus brief. See infra Part
IV.B. Compare FCC First Order, supra note 1, at 15183-84, with Brief of the United
States and the FCC as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellees, Murray v. Motorola, Inc.,
982 A.2d 764 (D.C. 2009) (No. 07-cv-1074) 2008 WL 7825518 at *15-18.
73 See DEVRA DAVIS, DISCONNECT: THE TRUTH ABOUT CELL PHONE RADIATION, WHAT
THE INDUSTRY HAS DONE TO HIDE IT, AND HOW TO PROTECT YOUR FAMILY 74, 78-79
(2010).
74 See Cell Phone Radiation: Science Review on Cancer Risks and Children’s Health,
ENVTL. WORKING GRP. 8 (2009),
http://static.ewg.org/reports/2012/cellphones/2009-cellphoneradiation-fullreport.pdf.
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume XIX, Issue 4
13
fourteen years since, a large amount of evidence has emerged that supports
the hypothesis that long-term exposure to low levels of radiation from cell
phones may cause serious deleterious health effects.75 While this data is
not significant enough to cause a national panic, it should be more than
sufficient to unseat the FCC’s position that it should disregard non-thermal
effects entirely when calculating the SAR standard.
[21] A result emblematic of the ongoing debate is The INTERPHONE
Study.76 Following expert recommendations and a feasibility study from
the late 1990s, the International Agency for Research on Cancer
developed The INTERPHONE Study.77 INTERPHONE was a
multinational case-control study involving thirteen countries, designed to
definitively resolve the question of whether cell phones caused brain
tumors.78
[22] Notwithstanding its ambitious size and scope, the conclusions of
INTERPHONE were ambiguous.79 Reporting of the conclusions was
delayed for years as the INTERPHONE scientists battled over the
75 See infra text accompanying notes 78-86.
76 INTERPHONE Study, INT’L AGENCY FOR RESEARCH ON CANCER,
http://interphone.iarc.fr/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2013).
77 Christopher Wild, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, INTERNATIONAL AGENCY FOR
RESEARCH ON CANCER, IARC REPORT TO THE UNION FOR INTERNATIONAL CANCER
CONTROL ON THE INTERPHONE STUDY 1 (2011), available at
http://interphone.iarc.fr/UICC_Report_Final_03102011.pdf.
78 See id.
79 See Mobile Madness, THE ECONOMIST (Sept. 25, 2008),
http://www.economist.com/node/12295222?story_id=12295222.
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume XIX, Issue 4
14
meaning of their results.80 As described The Economist’s article in
September 2008:
The Interphone researchers are split into three camps.  One
believes any increased incidence of tumours shown in the
study is purely the result of the biases.  Another thinks it
really has found increased risks of certain tumours and
wants to call for precautionary measures.  A third group is
just keeping quiet. One person who knows many of the
scientists, but prefers not to be named, describes the
relations between members of the three groups as
“strained”—harsh language in the world of scientific
research.81
[23] Aside from brain tumors, however, much research has been
conducted regarding other non-thermal biological effects of cell phone
radiation.  Among them, a recent Danish study noted an increased risk for
neurological symptoms, such as migraine and vertigo for cell phone
users.82 A study from the University of California, Los Angeles, found a
correlation between prenatal exposure to cell phone radiation and
behavioral problems in children.83 Studies from the United States, Japan,
Australia, and Europe reported that exposure to cell phone radiation has an
80 See Ian Sample, Mobile Phone Study Finds No Solid Link to Brain Tumours, THE
GUARDIAN (May 14, 2010, 14:15),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/science/2010/may/17/mobile-phones-brain-cancer-study.
81 Mobile Madness, supra note 83.
82 See generally Joachim Schüz et al., Risks for Central Nervous System Diseases Among
Mobile Phone Subscribers: A Danish Retrospective Cohort Study, 4 PLOS ONE e4389
(2009),
http://www.plosone.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0004389.
83 See generally Hozefa A. Divan et al., Prenatal and Postnatal Exposure to Cell Phone
Use and Behavioral Problems in Children, 19 EPIDEMIOLOGY 523, 523-29 (2008).
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adverse effect on sperm count, motility, and vitality.84 Studies also
reported increased risk of salivary gland tumors among cell phone users.85
[24] Although the evidence has not demonstrated a “smoking gun” link
between cell phone radiation and negative health impacts, it strongly
suggests that at a minimum, a precautionary approach should be adopted.
Nonetheless, since 1997 the FCC has not changed its stance that the SAR
standard should ignore the possibility of non-thermal effects on the human
body.86 With the body of data growing, many other nations have taken
precautionary actions in contrast to the United States.87
84 See generally Alaa J. Hamada et al., Cell Phones and Their Impact on Male Fertility:
Fact or Fiction, 5 OPEN REPRODUCTIVE SCI. J. 125, 125-37 (2011);  Nader Salama et al.,
Effects of Exposure to a Mobile Phone on Testicular Function and Structure in Adult
Rabbit, 33 INT’L J. ANDROLOGY 88, 88-94 (2010); Ashok Agarwal et al., Effects of
Radiofrequency Electromagnetic Waves from Cellular Phones on Human Ejaculated
Semen: An In Vitro Pilot Study, 92 J. FERTIL. STERIL. 1318, 1318-25 (2009); Geoffry De
Iuliis et al., Mobile Phone Radiation Induces Reactive Oxygen Species Production and
DNA Damage in Human Spermatozoa In Vitro (2009), 4 PLOS ONE e6446,
http://www.plosone.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0006446; ;
Osman Erogul et al., Effects of Electromagnetic Radiation from a Cellular Phone on
Human Sperm Motility: An In Vitro Study. 37 ARCH. MED. RES. 840, 840-43 (2006); Imre
Fejes et al., Is There a Relationship Between Cell Phone Use and Semen Quality? , 51
ARCHIVE ANDROLOGY 285, 385-93 (2005).
85 See, e.g., Siegal Sadetzki et al., Cellular Phone Use and Risk of Benign and
Malignant Parotid Gland Tumors-A Nationwide Case-Control Study, 167 AM. J.
EPIDEMIOLOGY 457, 457-67 (2008). But see Lonn et al., Mobile Phone Use and Risk of
Parotid Gland Tumor, 164 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 637, 637–43 (2006) (finding, after
conducting a study, that the evidence does not support this hypothesis).
86 See supra Part II.A.
87 See Worldwide Cell Phone Safety Recommendations and Policies, SAFER PHONE ZONE
(Oct. 8, 2011), http://www.saferphonezone.com/worldwide-cell-phone-safety-
recommendations-and-policies/.
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C. The National and International Response to the Scientific
Debate
[25] The United States has not taken any further preventative actions to
protect the public from the potential dangers of prolonged cell phone
exposure.  The FCC and the cell phone lobby, the CTIA, have both taken
the position that the SAR of a phone is immaterial so long as it is within
the FCC standard.88 The FCC formerly counseled potential cell phone
purchasers to buy phones with lower SAR as a precautionary measure;
however, that warning was recently removed from the FCC website.89
The vice president of the CTIA has argued against consumers buying
lower SAR phones, analogizing that “[w]hat science tells us is, ‘If the sign
on the highway says safe clearance is 12 feet,’ it doesn’t matter if your
vehicle is 4 feet, 6 feet or 10 feet tall; you’re going to pass through safely.
The same theory applies to SAR values and wireless devices.”90
[26] The international response to recent data is at odds with the United
States and the position of the FCC and CTIA.  France has banned the
advertising of cell phones to children because of evidence that children,
who have thinner skulls and developing nervous systems, are more
88 See EWG’s Guide to Safer Cell Phone Use: FCC Dropped Cell Phone Caution
Opposed by Industry, ENVTL. WORKING GRP. (June 15, 2012), http://www.ewg.org/fcc-
dropped-cell-phone-caution-opposed-industry; Randall Stross, Should You be Snuggling
With Your Cellphone? , N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/14/business/14digi.html.
89 See EWG’s Guide to Safer Cell Phone Use, supra note 88.  The actions of the FCC to
remove the SAR warning have led many critics to believe that the agency has been
captured by cell phone industry lobbyists. See id.
90 Stross, supra note 88.
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susceptible to cell phone radiation.91 France also requires that all phones
be sold with wired headsets to keep radiation away from the brain.92
[27] Germany has been advocating a cell phone SAR safety level of 0.6
W/kg (as compared with America’s 1.6 W/kg) through its “Blue Angel”
Program.93 The Blue Angel Program grants a special eco-seal of approval
to all phones meeting the lower SAR standard and as of 2008, has been
somewhat successful, with approximately thirty percent of cell phones in
the German market having emissions at or below 0.6 W/kg.94
[28] Other nations have issued health warnings and safe usage
guidelines.  In Israel, the Health Ministry asks parents to limit the cell
phone use of their children in order to minimize radiation exposure.95 The
Swiss Federal Office of Public Health advises that all consumers, but
especially children, should buy phones with low SAR and keep calls
short.96 The Swiss Public Health Office further counsels that “[w]henever
91 Geoffrey Lean, French Government Bans Advertising of Mobiles to Children, THE
INDEPENDENT (Jan. 11, 2009), http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-
tech/news/french-government-bans-advertising-of-mobiles-to-children-1299673.html.
92 Id.
93 See Specific Absorption Rates (SAR) for Mobile Phones, BUNDESAMT FÜR
STRAHLENSCHUTZ, http://www.bfs.de/en/elektro/oekolabel.html (last modified Aug. 31
2012).
94 See Blue Angel Goes Mobile, DER BLAUE ENGEL, Aug. 2007, available at
http://www.blauer-
engel.de/en/blauer_engel/press/newsletter/newsletter_detail.php?we_objectID=121.
95 See Yuval Azoulay & Zafrir Rinat, Health Ministry Calls for Parents to Limit Kids’
Use of Cell Phones, HAARETZ (July 28, 2008), http://www.haaretz.com/print-
edition/news/health-ministry-calls-for-parents-to-limit-kids-use-of-cell-phones-1.250559.
96 See Mobile Phones, FED. OFF. PUB. HEALTH,
http://www.bag.admin.ch/themen/strahlung/00053/00673/04265/index.html?lang=en (last
updated June 6, 2011).
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possible, only use your phone when the signal quality is good.”97 This is
indicative of the fact that when service is poor, a cell phone emits a larger
SAR as it boosts power to gain a better signal.98
[29] In the United Kingdom, the Public Health Ministry has required
that SAR measurements be displayed at all points of sale and asks
consumers to compare SAR values against the exposure limits and buy
phones with lower SAR.99 Contrary to the CTIA’s argument, the growing
international consensus is that although the highway sign may say “safe
clearance is 12 feet,” the closer to the ground, the safer you may be.100
[30] Today in the United States there are over 300 million cell phone
users.101 Sixty-six percent of children eight to eighteen years old have
their own cell phones,102 and young adults and adolescents will be exposed
97 Id.
98 See generally Lena Hillert et al., Call-Related Factors Influencing Output Power From
Mobile Phones, 16 J. EXPOSURE SCI. ENVTL. EPIDEMIOLOGY 507, 507-14 (2006)
(concluding that urban and rural areas should be weighed in an exposure index for
classification of SAR exposure from cell phones)
99 See U.K. DEP’T OF HEALTH, GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO THE REPORT FROM THE
INDEPENDENT EXPERT GROUP ON MOBILE PHONES (2004), available at
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/
Publications/PublicationsPolicyAndGuidance/Browsable/DH_4903699.
100 See Worldwide Cell Phone Safety Recommendations and Policies, supra note 87
(detailing different countries approaches).
101 Semi-Annual Year-End 2012 Wireless Industry Survey, CTIA: THE WIRELESS ASS’N 2
(2012), http://files.ctia.org/pdf/CTIA_Survey_YE_2012_Graphics-FINAL.pdf.
102 Victoria J. Rideout et al., KAISER FAMILY FOUND. GENERATION M2, MEDIA IN THE
LIVES OF 8-18-YEAR OLDS 3 (2010), available at
http://www.kff.org/entmedia/mh012010pkg.cfm.
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to low levels of radiation from cell phones for their entire lives.103 The
1996 FCC SAR standard remains unchanged and unchallenged.  While the
lack of action by the FCC would not be problematic if injured consumers
could resort to the courts for both compensatory damages and to
incentivize cell phone manufacturers to take an appropriate level of
precaution when designing cell phones, implied conflict preemption has
barred such suits from being litigated on the merits.104
III. CONFLICT PREEMPTION
[31] Cell phone makers have consistently and successfully relied on the
affirmative defense of implied conflict preemption to bar radiation suits
from being litigated on the merits.105 Although one would imagine that
the primary hurdle in cell phone litigation amidst scientific uncertainty
should be proving causation,106 cell phone makers have wielded the
doctrine of conflict preemption as a firewall to prevent reaching an
argument over causation.107 With courts dismissing cases on grounds of
conflict preemption, cell phone makers have limited incentive to lower
cell phone radiation emissions.  Although the Supreme Court has held that
103 See Hilary Stout, Toddlers’ Favorite Toy: The iPhone, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/17/fashion/17TODDLERS.html?_r=1 (indicating that
children are exposed to cell phones at increasingly early ages).
104 See infra Part III.B.
105 See, e.g., Farina v. Nokia, Inc., 625 F.3d 97, 108, 115-19, 121-22, 133-34 (3d Cir.
2010); Murray v. Motorola, Inc., 982 A.2d 764, 769, 775-78, 785, 789 (D.C. 2009).
106 See Newman v. Motorola, Inc., 78 F. App’x 292, 294 (4th Cir. 2003) (demonstrating
the difficulty of getting a causation argument past the trial judge and to the jury in the
face of scientific uncertainty).  See generally Benjamin J. Wolf, “Can You Hear Me
Now?”: Cellular Phones and Mass Tort Litigation After Newman v. Motorola, Inc., 14
ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 267 (2003).
107 See infra Part III.B.
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there exist situations in which the doctrine of conflict preemption should
bar state tort suits, the FCC SAR standard is not among them.108
A. Regulatory Conflict Preemption of State Products Liability
Claims
[32] In certain narrow circumstances, state law tort suits can be barred
because they impliedly conflict with federal agency regulations.109 Cell
phone manufacturers have argued that the FCC SAR standard is a
regulation that bars state suits.110 The Supreme Court has only allowed
such agency regulations to have preemptive force over state tort suits in a
few cases,111 none of which are analogous to cases involving the SAR
standard.
1. Foundational Preemption Doctrine
[33] Cell phone manufacturers have asserted that state tort lawsuits
against their companies are barred by preemption because the success of
such suits would interfere with the FCC SAR standard.112 State laws can
be preempted either expressly or impliedly under the Supremacy Clause of
the Constitution.113 Express preemption is confined to those statutory
108 See infra Part III.A.2; see, e.g., Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n. v. De la Cuesta, 458
U.S. 141, 159 (1982).
109 See supra Part I.A.1.
110 See infra Part III.A.2.
111 Id.
112 See infra Part III.B.
113 The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution declares that “[t]he Laws of the United
States . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; . . . anything in the Constitution or Laws
of any state to the Contrary notwithstanding.”  U.S. CONST. art. VI., § 2.
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume XIX, Issue 4
21
clauses that explicitly declare a federal law to be supreme.114 Implied
preemption requires looking into the meaning and purpose of the
statute.115 Courts have recognized two forms of implied preemption: field
and conflict.116 Courts find field preemption when a federal scheme is so
pervasive that it is clear that Congress did not intend state laws to
supplement it.117
[34] Under the doctrine of implied conflict preemption, federal law
supplants state law either where it is impossible for individuals to comply
with both federal and state law, or where the state law is a significant
obstacle to the accomplishment of a stated federal objective.118 There is a
114 See Barnett Bank of Marion Cnty. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 31 (1996) (noting that
statutory language “reveals an explicit congressional intent to preempt state law”).  In
each of the cell phone cases in which the courts barred the suits, the defendants first
argued that the cases were barred by express preemption; however, the courts have
consistently rejected that argument. See, e.g., Farina v. Nokia, Inc., 625 F.3d 97, 118-20
(3d Cir. 2010); Murray v. Motorola, Inc., 982 A.2d 764, 772–74 (D.C. 2009).
115 See Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992).
116 Id.
117 Id. (stating that state law is pre-empted if federal law so thoroughly occupies a
legislative field “as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the
States to supplement it”). In each of the cell phone cases in which the courts barred the
suits, the defendants second argument was that the TCA so thoroughly occupied the field
of telecommunications regulations that the state tort suits against cell phone makers were
barred by field preemption. See Farina, 625 F.3d at 121; Murray, 982 A.2d at 785. The
courts rejected these arguments in each case. See Farina, 625 F.3d at 121-22; Murray,
982 A.2d at 785-88.
118 Barnett, 517 U.S. at 31 (“Compliance with both [federal and state] statutes may be a
‘physical impossibility’ . . . or, the state law may ‘stan[d] as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” (quoting
Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43; Hines v. Davidowitz,
312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941))); see also Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 873
(2000) (recognizing conflict pre-emption when the state law interferes with congressional
intent).
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general presumption in preemption cases against finding state laws to be
impliedly preempted (largely because of concerns over federalism)119 and
the critical inquiry is whether Congress “clearly” intended federal law to
supersede state law.120
[35] While state level tort suits among private parties would not seem to
conflict with federal legislative goals, the Supreme Court has recognized
that if the award of damages in a state tort suit would interfere with a
federal objective, federal law can bar state tort liability by implied conflict
preemption.121 The Court explained that tort liability is a powerful
government method of controlling conduct and if liability under state law
discourages or prevents compliance with federal law, the state tort suit
must be barred.122 Areas of law that are among traditional state police
powers, however, such as health and safety, are subject to a somewhat
heightened level of conflict preemption scrutiny.123 Cell phone tort suits
typically allege serious health concerns and therefore fall under the rubric
119 See e.g., CSX Transp. Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993) (stating that
preemption “will not lie unless it is ‘the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.’”
(quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947))).
120 See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516 (recognizing the presumption of states’ authority
unless it contravenes a “‘clear and manifest purpose of Congress’”) (quoting Rice, 331
U.S. at 230)).
121 See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 323-24 (2008) (discussing federal
preemption to damages for certain common-law causes of action).
122 See id. at 324.
123 See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (“[B]ecause the States are
independent sovereigns in our federal system, we have long presumed that Congress does
not cavalierly pre-empt state-law causes of action.”); CSX Transp., Inc., 507 U.S. at 663-
64 (“In the interest of avoiding unintended encroachment on the authority of the States,
however, a court interpreting a federal statute pertaining to a subject traditionally
governed by state law will be reluctant to find pre-emption.”).
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of state laws that ensure the health and safety of their citizens.124 These
suits should not be preempted by federal law under implied conflict
preemption unless it is the “clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”125
2. Leading Cases on Conflict Preemption of State Tort
Suits by Federal Regulatory Actions
[36] The Supreme Court has held that agency regulations like the FCC
SAR standard can have preemptive force to bar state tort suits in some
circumstances.126 The Court’s decisions in Geier v. American Honda
Motor Co.127 and Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine128 identify when federal
regulatory agency actions may preempt state tort liability suits by conflict
preemption.  The appellate courts that have assessed the preemptive
impact of the FCC SAR standard utilized the reasoning from both Geier
and Sprietsma in their analyses.129
124 See Pinney v. Nokia, 402 F.3d 430, 457 (4th Cir. 2005) (citing Medtronic, 518 U.S. at
485) (explaining that cell phone tort cases get “a strong presumption against preemption”
because of state interest in health and safety of citizens).
125 See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516 (quoting Rice, 331 U.S. at 230).
126 See Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153-54 (1982)
(recognizing implied preemption).
127 Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 864 (2000).
128 Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 54 (2002).
129 See, e.g., Farina v. Nokia, Inc., 625 F.3d 97, 123 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Geier, 529
U.S. at 886).  Recent Supreme Court cases such as Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009),
and Pliva, Inc., v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011), are not inconsistent with Geier and
Sprietsma.  In Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 558-60, 572-73 , the Court held that state drug labeling
requirements did not conflict with federal drug labeling requirements because name
brand drug manufacturers could unilaterally strengthen their labeling to comply with both
federal and state standards.  The Court in Wyeth held that state suits were not preempted
notwithstanding an agency amicus brief to the contrary. Id. at 580 n.13.  In Pliva, the
Court held that state drug labeling law was preempted because it would be impossible for
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[37] Geier and Sprietsma stand for several key propositions.  First,
affirmative regulations promulgated by agencies can preempt state tort
suits if the success of those suits would impose a duty the regulation
expressly does not require.130 Second, the purposeful failure to regulate in
an area should not preempt state tort suits unless the agency, by not
regulating, was attempting to deregulate an area (and thus a state tort suit
would add regulation to a subject area the federal government was
attempting to deregulate).131 Third, agency amicus briefs explaining the
objectives of their regulations are entitled to be given weight for conflict
preemption analysis.132 Fourth, the statutory goal of national uniformity
does not necessarily displace state common law tort suits because of the
weight given to traditional state concerns for health and safety.133
[38] In Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., the Supreme Court held
that a state tort suit against a car manufacture conflicted with an agency
regulation and was thus barred by implied conflict preemption.134 Geier
generic drug manufacturers to comply with state laws requiring stronger warning labels
and federal law requiring them to replicate exactly the labeling of the name brand drug
manufacturers. Pliva, 131 S. Ct. at 2577-78. Pliva was decided under the
“impossibility” branch of implied conflict preemption, not the “significant obstacle”
branch, and is therefore distinct from the cell phone radiation cases. Id.
130 See Geier, 529 U.S. at 881-82; Sprietsma, 537 U.S. at 67-68.  Interestingly, the United
States has recently flipped sides and argued against the preemptive effect of FMVSS 208,
the regulation standard considered in Geiger, in Williamson v. Mazda Motor of America,
Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1131, 1135-37 (2011) (finding no preemption).
131 See Sprietsma, 537 U.S. at 64-65 (stating “that a Coast Guard decision not to regulate
a particular aspect of boating safety is fully consistent with an intent to preserve state
regulatory authority pending the adoption of specific federal standards”).
132 See Geier, 529 U.S. at 883-84.
133 See Spriesma, 537 U.S. at 70.
134 See Geier, 529 U.S. at 884-85.
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confronted a state tort suit that allegedly conflicted with a safety standard
under the National Traffic and Motor Safety Act of 1966.135 Under the
Act, the Department of Transportation (“DOT”) promulgated Federal
Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208 (“FMVSS 208”), which gave car
manufacturers the option of installing either airbags or other types of
restraint systems in an effort to give them the flexibility to try different
safety methods.136 The plaintiff in the case, a car accident victim, alleged
in part that Honda was negligent for not requiring airbags in its vehicle.137
The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff’s tort suit was barred because of
an implied conflict with FMVSS 208.138
[39] The Court explained that the plaintiff’s suit “depends upon its
claim that manufacturers had a duty to install an airbag,” and “[i]t thereby
would have presented an obstacle to the variety and mix of devices that
[FMVSS 208] sought.”139 The Court noted that although the DOT
regulations did not specifically address preemption, the DOT’s
interpretation of the objectives of FMVSS 208 in its amicus brief was
persuasive in the preemption analysis.140 Therefore, Geier stands for the
proposition that a state tort suit will be barred by conflict preemption if the
suit seeks to impose a duty (airbag requirement) that conflicts with a
federal regulation (no airbag requirement).141
135 Id. at 864-65.
136 See id. at 879-80.
137 See id. at 881.
138 See id.
139 Geiger, 529 U.S. at 881.
140 See id. at 883-84.
141 In dissent, Justice Stevens called the Court’s ruling an "unprecedented extension of the
doctrine of pre-emption.” Id. at 886 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  The recent decision in
Williamson v. Mazda Motor of America does not alter the preemption landscape.  131 S.
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[40] In contrast to Geier, in Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, the Court
held that a state tort suit was not barred by a federal agency decision not to
promulgate a rule requiring a safety device.142 Under the Federal Boat
Safety Act of 1971 (“FBSA”), the Secretary of Transportation delegated
authority to the United States Coast Guard to establish minimum safety
standards for recreational vessels.143 The FBSA, like the TCA, had a
saving clause which provided that “[c]ompliance with [the FBSA does]
not relieve a person from liability at common law or under State law.”144
[41] In 1988, the Coast Guard launched an investigation into the
potential advantages and disadvantages of propeller guards on motorboats,
and in 1990 decided not to promulgate a regulation requiring them.145 In
1995, the plaintiff’s wife died when she fell overboard and was struck by a
propeller that did not have a propeller guard.146 The plaintiff sued the
motor manufacturer, alleging that the motor was “unreasonably
dangerous” because it “was not protected by a propeller guard.”147 The
defendant argued that the decision by the Coast Guard not to require
Ct. 1131 (2011).  In Williamson, the Court held that that a later version of the same
regulation as Geier did not preempt state tort suits because unlike Geier, the objective of
the federal regulation was not to encourage a mixture of safety devices. Id. at 1137-38.
Therefore state law could require the use of one type of restraint system, lap and shoulder
belts, without becoming an obstacle to accomplishing a significant federal objective. Id.
at 1139-40.
142 Compare Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 63 (2002), with Geier, 529 U.S.
at 881.
143 See Sprietsma, 537 U.S. at 57.
144 Id. at 59.
145 See id. at 60-61.
146 Id. at 54-55.
147 Id. at 55.
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propeller guards meant that the defendant could not be held liable for not
putting propeller guards on its motors.148 Justice Stevens, who had
dissented in Geier, wrote the majority opinion in Sprietsma, reversed the
decision of the Illinois Supreme Court, and held that the tort suit was not
barred by conflict preemption.149
[42] The Court explained that unlike Geier, which dealt with an
affirmative regulation, the decision by the Coast Guard not to require
propeller guards was not the functional equivalent of a regulation that
prohibited their use.150 The Court noted that if an agency’s decision not to
regulate was, in fact, a conscious deregulation of a field, the decision
could bar state suits because state liability would in fact conflict with a
federal goal of deregulation.151 The Court distinguished Sprietsma from
Geier because in Sprietsma, the Coast Guard had only decided “the
available data did not meet the FBSA’s ‘stringent’ criteria for federal
regulation,” and not that the field of propeller safety should be deregulated
or that propeller guards should be prohibited.152 The insufficient data to
regulate on a federal level did not mean that the states could not fill the
gaps.153
148 See Sprietsma, 537 U.S. at 65.
149 See id. at 54, 70.
150 Id. at 65 (stating that “[i]t is quite wrong to view [the decision of the Coast Guard to
not require propeller guards] as the functional equivalent of a regulation prohibiting all
States . . . from adopting such a regulation”).
151 See id. at 66 (quoting Ark. Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 461
U.S. 375, 384 (1983)).
152See id. at 66-67.
153 See Sprietsma, 537 U.S. at 66-67.
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[43] As in Geier, the Court in Sprietsma gave substantial weight to the
regulating agency’s preemption analysis in its amicus brief.  While in
Geier the Secretary of Transportation argued for preemption (and the
Court found it),154 the Coast Guard in Sprietsma counseled against
preemption (and the Court did not find it).155
[44] The defendants had also argued in Sprietsma that because one of
the main goals of the FBSA was “fostering uniformity in manufacturing
regulations,” state tort suits should be barred because they could lead to
differing standards throughout the country.156 The majority rejected this
uniformity argument, explaining that while uniformity is an important
consideration, it “does not justify the displacement of state common-law
remedies.”157 The Court emphasized that uniformity arguments will not
be enough to override state sovereignty and bar state tort suits by conflict
preemption, especially in areas of traditional state police powers like
health and safety.158
B. Conflict Preemption by the FCC SAR Standard—The
Courts of Appeals Split
[45] Since 2000, there have been a handful of suits against cell phone
manufacturers alleging, among other things, that wireless telephones emit
unsafe levels of radiofrequency radiation and the manufacturers were
knowingly and negligently endangering the public by continuing to sell
154 See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 883-84 (2000).
155 See Sprietsma, 537 U.S. at 68.
156 Id. at 70.
157 Id.
158 See id.
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the phones without warnings or headsets.159 In each case, the defendants,
the cell phone manufacturers, moved to dismiss on grounds of federal
preemption.160 While all of the decisions rejected the defendants’
arguments of express preemption and field preemption, the courts
disagreed over whether the claims were barred by implied conflict
preemption.161 In Pinney v. Nokia, Inc.,162 the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss and held that the suits
were not preempted by the FCC SAR standard.163 In contrast, in Murray
v. Motorola, Inc.164 and Farina v. Nokia, Inc.,165 the District of Columbia
Appeals Court and Third Circuit Court of Appeals respectively upheld
dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claims on the grounds of conflict preemption
with the FCC standard.  These cases represent a fundamental disagreement
over the preemptive effect of the FCC SAR standard.
159 See, e.g., Farina v. Nokia, Inc., 625 F.3d 97, 104 (3d Cir. 2010); Pinney v. Nokia, Inc.,
402 F.3d 430, 439 (4th Cir. 2005); Murray v. Motorola, Inc., 982 A.2d 764, 768 (D.C.
2009).
160 See Farina, 625 F.2d at 121; Pinney, 402 F.3d at 442; Murray, 982 A.2d at 777.
161 See infra Part III.B.1-2.
162 See Pinney, 402 F.3d at 439.
163 See id. at 451.
164 Murray, 982 A.2d at 777.
165 Farina, 625 F.2d at 121.  The Pinney and Farina cases were actually combined at the
Multidistrict Litigation Panel, and in the Pinney decision the court dismissed the Farina
plaintiffs for lack of subject matter jurisdiction prior to the decision that the Pinney case
was not preempted.  See Pinney, 402 F.3d at 451.  The court in Farina had to first decide
whether the Pinney decision was the “law of the case” with regards to preemption. See
Farina, 625 F.3d at 117 n.21.
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1. Pinney v. Nokia – No Conflict Preemption
[46] In Pinney, the Fourth Circuit refused to read the TCA objective of
creating a national wireless network so broadly as to include the goal of
achieving a national radiofrequency radiation standard and therefore
refused to find a conflict with state tort claims.166 The Pinney plaintiffs
sued under state law, claiming that cell phones emit an unsafe level of
radiation and Nokia, in knowing this, had “negligently and fraudulently
endangered the consuming public by marketing wireless telephones
without headsets” to mitigate the danger.167
[47] The defendants raised the affirmative defense that the state law
claims were preempted by the FCC SAR standard because the plaintiffs
would have to prove that the FCC standard was insufficient in order to
prove their claims.168 The FCC took no part in the case.  Although the
district court dismissed the case on grounds of preemption, the Fourth
Circuit reversed and held that the suit could go forward, notwithstanding
the FCC SAR standard.169
[48] The court of appeals began its analysis by trumpeting the “strong
presumption” against conflict preemption, especially in the traditional
state domains of health and safety.170 The Fourth Circuit went on to reject
conflict preemption because it found no “congressional objective” to
preempt state radiofrequency radiation standards for cell phones.171
166 See Pinney, 402 F.3d at 458.
167 Id. at 440.
168 See id. at 447.
169 See id. at 455, 456-57.
170 Id. at 457 (citing Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)).
171 Pinney, 402 F.3d at 457-58.
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume XIX, Issue 4
31
[49] The court’s reasoning rested on three fundamental premises. First,
the court rejected the defendants’ “national uniformity” argument that the
TCA embodied a “sweeping congressional objective of ensuring that all
equipment used . . . be subject to exclusive national radiofrequency
radiation standards.”172 The court explained that the actual text of the
TCA, which referred primarily to carrier rate regulations and zoning
authority, related only to the objective of developing the physical
infrastructure necessary for a national wireless network, not to
nationalizing radiation standards.173
[50] Second, the court recognized that in the TCA, Congress had
specifically preempted only state regulation regarding “personal wireless
service facilities.”174 The court interpreted the narrow nature of the
express preemption provision as a strong indication that Congress did not
intend to preempt state regulation outside of this narrowly and explicitly
defined category.175 Finally, the court pointed to the saving clauses in
both the TCA and the FCA as additional strong factors that weighed
against barring state tort suits that were both not explicitly preempted and
seemingly explicitly preserved by the saving clauses.176 Finding no
evidence in the TCA of intent to preempt state tort suits or state
172 Id. at 457.
173 See id.
174 Id. at 458.
175 See id. at 458 (noting that the “specificity as to the preemptive nature of federal RF
radiation standards for . . . facilities weighs against a finding that Congress has an
implicit goal of making preemptive the radiofrequency radiation standards for . . .
wireless telephones”).
176 See Pinney, 402 F.3d at 458-59 (stating that the “savings clauses counsel against any
broad construction of the goals of [the TCA] that would create an implicit conflict with
state tort law”).
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radiofrequency standards, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that
the plaintiffs’ suit against the cell phone manufacturers could proceed.177
2. Murray v. Motorola and Farina v. Nokia – Conflict
Preemption
[51] In both Murray and Farina, appellate courts at the state and federal
level respectively departed from the reasoning of Pinney and held that an
implied conflict with the FCC SAR standard barred cell phone suits.178
While the Pinney decision had focused primarily on the sections of the
text of the TCA to read the statute narrowly and not in conflict, the
Murray and Farina courts largely deferred to the view of the FCC in its
amicus brief and to a broad reading of the objective of the TCA to find a
conflict and bar the plaintiffs’ claims.179
[52] In Murray, the plaintiffs brought state law tort claims alleging that
brain tumors and cancers were caused by the long-term use of the
defendants’ cellular phones.180 The plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that the
FCC SAR standard was inadequate and that the defendants were aware of
the inadequacies.181 Unlike Pinney, in which the FCC took no part in the
case, in Murray, the FCC filed an amicus brief arguing that the plaintiffs’
177 See id.
178 See Farina v. Nokia, Inc., 625 F.3d 97, 125-26 (3d Cir. 2010); Murray v. Motorola,
Inc., 982 A.2d 764, 768 (D.C. 2009). Although Murray is a D.C. Court of Appeals case,
not a federal case, and therefore does not contribute to the circuit split, it is instructive in
its analysis and comparisons to Pinney.
179 See infra notes 187-203 and accompanying text.
180 Murray, 982 A.2d at 768-69.
181 Id at 769.
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claims were preempted because they conflicted with the FCC SAR
standard.182
[53] The D.C. Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court decision to
dismiss the suit on grounds of conflict preemption.183 In accordance with
Geier and Sprietsma, the court gave great weight to the FCC’s amicus
brief184 and adopted the FCC’s view that allowing the suit to proceed
would “necessarily upset [the] balance [the agency struck].”185
[54] In Murray, the court declined to follow the Fourth Circuit’s
decision in Pinney for several reasons.  The Murray court stated that the
“primary reason” why the Pinney decision was not persuasive was “that
the court [in Pinney] appears to have reached its conclusion without
considering the views of the FCC.”186 Second, Murray rejected Pinney
because, according to the court in Murray, Pinney was not focused on the
182 See id. at 775. In agreeing with the FCC’s brief, the district court stated that “by
urging a jury to find that defendants’ cell phones emit unreasonably dangerous levels of
radiofrequency radiation even though the phones’ emissions are within the SAR
guidelines . . . plaintiffs are effectively seeking to lower the FCC’s current SAR
standard.” Id.
183 Id. at 789.
184 The court explained that it would defer to the FCC because of the FCC’s “‘unique
understanding of the statutes [it] administer[s] and [its] attendant ability to make
informed determinations about how state requirements may pose an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.’” Id. at
776-77 (quoting Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 577 (2009)) (alteration in original).
185 Murray, 982 A.2d at 777 (citation omitted).
186 Id. at 778 n.19 (citing Pinney v. Nokia, Inc., 402 F.3d 430, 457 (4th Cir. 2005)).  It
should be noted that the Pinney court did not consider the views of the FCC because the
FCC decided not to file an amicus brief in that case.
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SAR standard, but on whether states could require headsets.187 Third, the
D.C. Court of Appeals stated that the Pinney court gave unnecessary
weight to the fact that the FCC had enacted its regulations to satisfy the
NEPA and not the TCA.188
[55] The plaintiffs in Murray argued that their claimed injuries were the
results of “non-thermal” effects that the FCC standard had decidedly
ignored.189 The plaintiffs analogized the omission of regulation to the
Coast Guard’s decision not to require propeller guards in Sprietsma.190
The D.C. Court of Appeals held that the situation was distinguishable
from Sprietsma because while in Sprietsma the agency prescribed a floor,
in Murray, the FCC SAR standard was the floor and ceiling.191 Farina,
like Murray and Pinney, presented a class action of consumers claiming
injury from long-term exposure to cell phones.192 The Third Circuit Court
of Appeals in Farina, like the D.C. court in Murray, held that the state tort
law action against cell phone companies was barred by conflict
187 See id. As discussed above, the court in Pinney was cognizant that the plaintiff’s
claim required proof that the FCC SAR standard was insufficient. See supra notes 168-
77 and accompanying text.
188 See Murray, 982 A.2d at 778 n.19. As discussed above, the court in Pinney conducted
its entire analysis under the TCA and made little reference to the NEPA. See supra notes
172-77 and accompanying text.
189 See Murray, 982 A.2d at 779.
190 See id.
191 See id. at 780 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 104-204, at 95 (1995), reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, 68 (stating that in Sprietsma, the Court recognized that “Congress
authorized the issuance of regulations prescribing minimum safety standards,” but
“[h]ere, by contrast . . . Congress mandated that the FCC ‘shall . . . prescribe and make
effective rules regarding the environmental effects of radio frequency emissions’”
(omission in original)).
192 See Farina v. Nokia, Inc., 625 F.3d 97, 104 (3d Cir. 2010).
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preemption.193 The Farina court drew an analogy to Geier and explained
that the FCC had carefully balanced competing policy objectives in the
SAR standard.194 The Court of Appeals held that allowing state tort suits
to proceed may have the effect of upsetting the balance the FCC had
struck.195 The court also cited to the FCC’s amicus brief in Murray as
support for a finding of conflict preemption196 and stressed the need for
national uniformity.197 The Farina court disregarded the plaintiff’s
argument that the TCA Saving Clause counseled against a finding of
preemption and held that, regardless of the clause, the tort suits against
cell phone makers were barred.198
[56] After these three separate appeals court decisions, there is no
definitive resolution as to whether cell phone suits should be barred by
193 See id. at 123-27.
194 Id. at 129-30.
195 See id. In an interesting twist, the Third Circuit declared that “given the current state
of the science, the FCC considers all phones in compliance with its standards to be safe.”
See id. at 126.  The Third Circuit cited the FCC First Order from 1996 as demonstrative
of the current state of science. Id. at 126 (citing FCC First Order, supra note 1, at
15184).
196 See id. at 127.  The Third Circuit rejected the plaintiff’s argument that since the FCC
had previously disclaimed preemptive authority, its amicus brief supporting preemption
should be given little weight. See id. (citing Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1201-02
(2009)), for the argument that an agency’s view on preemption should be given no
deference when the agency had previously asserted that state law did not erect an obstacle
to the agency’s objectives. The court held that this case was distinct from Wyeth because,
according to the court, the FCC in its First Order and Second Order had not disclaimed
preemptive effect but had merely reserved the right to make a decision on preemption
later, a decision it made in its amicus brief. See id.
197 See Farina, 625 F.3d. at 124-25.
198 See id. at 131-32.
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conflict preemption.  Moreover, with Murray in 2009 and Farina in 2010,
the courts are trending away from the earlier decision in Pinney and
toward a deferential view of an FCC standard that has remained
unchanged for almost two decades.  Nevertheless, with evidence of the
non-thermal effects continuing to mount each month,199 a course
correction in the courts should ensue.
IV. PROPOSAL – JUDICIAL ACTION TO ALLOW SUITS AGAINST CELL
PHONE MANUFACTURERS
[57] In order to ensure that cell phone manufacturers are taking the
efficient level of precaution and not hiding behind the outdated SAR
standard, the courts should allow tort suits against cell phone
manufacturers to proceed.  Cell phone manufacturers should be held
responsible, thus incentivizing them to lower the SAR in phones.  When
faced with the affirmative defense of preemption in the future, courts
should hold that the suits are not barred by conflict preemption.  However,
if the trend towards preemption continues in the courts of appeals, the
Supreme Court should grant certiorari and resolve the circuit split in favor
of allowing suits to proceed.
[58] The doctrine of implied conflict preemption should not bar state
tort law claims against cell phone manufacturers.  From a purely doctrinal
standpoint, the cell phone radiation cases should not be barred because
they are analogous to the Supreme Court’s decision in Sprietsma200 and
distinct from its decision in Geier.201 The preemption provisions and
saving clauses of the FCA and TCA as well as the FCC’s own position in
199 See Tara Parker-Pope, Cellphone Use Tied to Changes in Brain Activity, WELL N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 22, 2011, 4:21 PM), http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/02/22/cellphone-
use-tied-to-changes-in-brain-activity/.
200 See supra Part III.A.2.
201 See id.
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the FCC First Order and FCC Second Order all demonstrate that cell
phone suits should not be barred.202 When the statutory and regulatory
language is combined with the general presumption against preemption,
especially in the field of health and safety, it is clear that regardless of a
federal objective of uniformity or the FCC amicus brief to the contrary,
state tort suits against cell phone manufacturers should not be barred.203
[59] Furthermore, from a policy perspective, these suits should be
allowed to proceed precisely because the risk is unknown, yet potentially
catastrophic.204 In the face of such uncertainty and risk, the highest level
of efficient safety should be taken.  Yet, with the FCC standard as a shield,
cell phone manufacturers may not be taking the appropriate level of
care.205
A. Precedent Dictates That Cell Phone Suits Should Not Be
Preempted by the FCC Standard
[60] Supreme Court precedent dictates that the FCC SAR standard
should not preempt state tort suits.  The Court has consistently held that
there is a “presumption against preemption,” especially in areas of
traditional state control like health and safety.206 Under this presumption,
state law should not be preempted unless it was the “clear and manifest
202 See supra Part II.A.
203 See id.
204 See infra Part IV.C.
205 See id.
206 Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996); see also Hillsborough Cnty. v.
Automated Med. Labs. Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 715-16 (1985); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
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purpose of Congress.”207 In Sprietsma, the Court recognized that the
Coast Guard’s decision to forgo regulation did not carry preemptive force
because it was not an affirmative statement that propeller guards were
unnecessary, rather it was premised upon the fact that there was
insufficient data to regulate on a federal level.208 Similarly, in its 1997
FCC Second Order, the FCC explicitly stated that it did not independently
evaluate the non-thermal effects when calculating the SAR standard
because expert organizations found insufficient evidence that such effects
existed.209
[61] The decision of the FCC to not include non-thermal effects did not
amount to a prohibition on states from allowing tort suits over the non-
thermal effects of cell phones.  In Sprietsma, the Court explained that the
Coast Guard’s decision to not mandate propeller guards did not prohibit
state regulations because the Coast Guard “did not take the further step of
deciding that . . . the States . . . should not impose some version of
propeller guard regulation.”210 In contrast, the FCC did take that further
step, albeit in the opposite direction.211 Rather than declare that the states
were barred from imposing standards with regard to non-thermal effects,
the FCC expressly stated in 1996 and reaffirmed in 1997 that the SAR
standard it set forth would not preempt state laws.212 The FCC’s decision
to ignore non-thermal effects in its standards, when coupled with its order
against preemption, amount to a ruling that the states could “fill the
207 Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485.
208 Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 65-66 (2002).
209 See FCC Second Order, supra note 46, at 13504-05.
210 See Sprietsma, 537 U.S. at 65-67.
211 See FCC Second Order, supra note 46, at 13529.
212 See id.
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gaps”213 through allowing tort suits geared toward protecting the health of
state residents from the non-thermal effects of cell phone radiation.
[62] Unlike the law at issue in the Supreme Court’s decision in Geier,
state liability will not undermine the federal SAR standard because it is
only a minimum safety requirement.  In Geier the DOT allowed car
companies to use either airbags or other safety restraints.214 State tort suits
were barred because a state finding of liability for cars that did not include
airbags would essentially result in an airbag requirement in that state,
nullifying the federal goal of variety between airbags and other safety
devices.215
[63] In contrast, if a state found liability for phones with a SAR of 1.5
w/kg, cell phone manufacturers would have an incentive to lower their
phones maximum SAR to below 1.5 w/kg; however, this would not
interfere with the FCC federal goal that all phones have SARs below 1.6
w/kg.  The new phones would be below 1.6 w/kg, but they would also
comply with state law.  The FCC SAR standard is distinct from the DOT
regulation in Geier because state liability would not nullify the federal
requirement.  State tort suits, therefore, should not be barred on account of
the SAR standard.216
213 See Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 65 (2002).
214 See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 876 (2000).
215 See id at 881.
216 There is a counterargument that the national system of cell towers requires
uniformity—namely, if phones have less powerful SAR then the towers will need to
boost power, therefore different state maximums may inhibit a fully functioning national
system. But see infra Part V.A (arguing that lower SAR standards would not affect the
national system).
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B. The Statutory Saving Clauses and the FCC Orders Indicate
an Intent to Allow Suits to Proceed
[64] The multiple saving clauses in the applicable statutes indicate a
congressional intent to allow state suits to proceed.  The Federal
Communications Act of 1934 declares that “[n]othing contained in this
chapter shall in any way abridge or alter the remedies now existing at
common law or by statute.”217 The TCA, while containing an express
preemption provision barring state laws regarding the placement of
wireless facilities, retains a saving clause to limit its preemptive power to
only the express facilities context.218 This saving clause, appropriately
titled “no implied effect,” states explicitly that the TCA “shall not be
construed to modify, impair, or supersede Federal, State, or local law
unless expressly so provided.”219 If, as the Supreme Court has often
repeated, the “ultimate touchstone” of a preemption analysis is the purpose
of Congress, then the “no implied effect” provision should weaken any
argument that Congress intended the TCA to bar suits regarding
radiofrequency radiation emissions from cell phones when the legislation
only expressly preempts facilities.220
[65] Although not exactly saving clauses, the FCC First Order and
FCC Second Order each declared that the SAR standard would not
217 Federal Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 414 (2006).
218 See Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 152 (2006).
219 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104 § 601(c)(1), 110 Stat. 143-44
(1996) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 152 (2006)).
220 The Court stated in Geier that the existence of a statutory saving clause “does not bar
the ordinary working of conflict pre-emption principles;” however, the combination of
the express preemption provision and the “no implied effect” foster a strong implication
of congressional intent. Geier, 529 U.S. at 869.
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preempt state tort suits premised upon radiation emissions.221 The
decision to not preempt was not just a policy choice; it was based on the
FCC’s understanding that under the TCA, it did not have the authority to
preempt outside of the facilities context.222 The FCC First Order also
created a procedure for aggrieved parties to petition the FCC to change its
ruling on preemption in the future; however, it maintained that such a
petition would have to first address whether the FCC even had such
authority under the TCA.223
[66] The FCC pronouncements in the FCC First Order and FCC
Second Order serve two vital functions.  First, they strengthen the earlier
assertion that the TCA does not allow the preemption of state tort suits
because this is clearly how the FCC itself understood the TCA to operate.
Second, the creation of an official procedure for petitioning the FCC for
preemption weakens the agency’s use of an amicus brief to claim that its
SAR standard has preemptive effects.224
221 See FCC Second Order, supra note 46, at 13529; FCC First Order, supra note 1, at
15183-84.
222 See FCC Second Order, supra note 46, at 13498; FCC First Order, supra note 1, at
15183-84.
223 See FCC First Order, supra note 1, at 15184.
224 While the Court did not specifically state that agency amicus briefs are controlling, in
both Geier and Sprietsma the Court sided with the agency amicus and found their briefs
highly persuasive. See Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 67-68 (2002); Geier,
529 U.S. at 883.  In contrast, the fact that the FCC has, long before filing its amicus brief,
proclaimed that it does not have the legal authority to preempt under the TCA and has
created an official procedure for asking the agency to preempt radiation suits—a
procedure that neither the agency itself nor any cell phone companies have taken up—are
strong arguments for giving the FCC amicus brief less weight than the amicus in both
Geier and Sprietsma.
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[67] As a result of the FCC First Order and FCC Second Order, the
FCC amicus brief in favor of preemption should be given little or no
deference.  The Supreme Court has stated that when an agency has
previously advocated a position against preemption or created a
procedural mechanism for formally recognizing preemption, any later
unilateral decision by the agency to preempt state law is “inherently
suspect in light of this procedural failure.”225 The FCC’s creation of a
formal procedure to petition the FCC to change its rules to preempt state
laws and the FCC’s subsequent ignorance of its own procedure, is a
“procedural failure” that makes the agency’s amicus brief highly suspect.
C. Policy Rationales Support Allowing Cell Phone Litigation
to Proceed
[68] From a policy perspective, suits against cell phone manufacturers
should not be barred by the doctrine of conflict preemption because the
actual danger posed by cell phones is still inconclusive.226 While cell
phone manufacturers have argued that the FCC has weighed the dangers
into the FCC SAR standard, the evidence indicates that the FCC did not
take non-thermal effects, the truly dangerous potential consequences, into
account.227 Furthermore, the sheer size and scope of potential future harm
that could result from non-thermal effects counsels strongly in favor of
taking the utmost precaution.  The attitude of other nations that have
guided their citizens towards phones with lower SARs stands in stark
contrast with the cavalier stance of the FCC, the CTIA, and the cell phone
industry.228
225 Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 577 (2009).
226 See supra Part II.C.
227 See supra Part II.B.
228 See supra Part II.C.
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[69] Allowing litigation against cell phone manufacturers would permit
the tort system to incentivize phone makers to take the appropriate level of
precaution.229 The current system of conflict preemption results in
disincentivizing cell phone manufacturers to conduct safety research into
their products because they are not threatened by the possibility of tort
litigation.230 Moreover, the current system provides an incentive to cell
phone manufacturers not to research their products because this lack of
research decreases plaintiffs’ potential ability to prove causation and/or
knowledge of effects should the courts cease to find the suits barred by
conflict preemption.231
[70] Allowing these suits to proceed would put the emphasis onto the
part of the litigation where it should be—the merits.  Cell phone
manufacturers would likely cite to the FCC SAR standard to show that the
sales and advertising of their phones as “safe” was not “unreasonable” and
plaintiffs would be hard pressed to prove otherwise.  If, however, it
became clear that cell phone companies were aware that the FCC SAR
standard was deficient and still took no action, there is no legitimate
reason that the SAR standard should stand as a bar to holding such
reckless companies accountable.
[71] Finally, plaintiffs would still have the heavy burden of proving
causation.232 If plaintiffs were able to prove both knowledge and
229 See Wolf, supra note 106, at 294-95.
230 See id. at 295.
231 See id. at 295 n.188 (citing Rebecca S. Dressler et al., Breast Implants Revisited:
Beyond Science on Trial, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 705, 775 (1997) (noting that the current tort
system gives manufacturers an incentive to not properly research their products, as this
will decrease plaintiffs’ potential to prove causation)).
232 See Newman v. Motorola, Inc., 78 F. App’x 292, 293 (2003); Wolf, supra note 106, at
272-73.
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causation, not only should cell phone companies be held accountable, but
the FCC should take such an outcome as an indicator that the FCC SAR
standard, unchanged since 1997, was overdue for a reevaluation.
Therefore, the threat of litigation could serve not only to incentivize cell
phone manufacturers, but successful litigation could also act as a trigger
for the FCC to reconsider the SAR standard in light of the most recent
scientific findings on non-thermal effects.
V. COUNTERARGUMENTS AGAINST ALLOWING CELL PHONE SUITS
[72] Those parties in favor of the FCC SAR standard preempting state
suits have reasonable arguments.  The primary reasons that critics point to
for preempting cell phone litigation are the need for a nationally uniform
wireless network and the high costs that litigation would impose on the
industry (and would be passed on to consumers).233 While these
arguments are facially convincing, each is flawed.
A. National Uniformity of the Wireless Network
[73] Proponents of the preemptive power of the FCC SAR standard
have argued and courts that have found preemption have agreed, that the
need for a nationally uniform wireless communications network requires
that states do not interfere with the federal SAR standard.234 This
uniformity argument can be overcome on both legal and factual
grounds.235
233 See Farina v. Nokia, Inc., 625 F.3d 97, 132 (3d Cir. 2010); Wolf, supra note 106, at
271.
234 See Farina, 625 F.3d at 124-26; Murray v. Motorola, Inc., 982 A.2d 764, 785-86
(D.C. 2009).
235 The “national uniformity” argument refers to the ability to have a national wireless
network; it does not refer to the inability of the cell phone manufacturer to sell the same
phone across the fifty states.  That was not the intention of the TCA nor should it be a
concern of preemption law.  Regardless, there are at least two responses:  First, as argued,
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[74] Legally, in Sprietsma, the Supreme Court declared that while
“[u]niformity is undoubtedly important,” it did not “justify the
displacement of state common-law remedies that compensate accident
victims.”236 In this case, while uniformity of the SAR standard may have
some intrinsic value (a factual issue to be challenged momentarily), it is
not substantial enough to overcome the state’s fundamental interest in
matters of residents’ health and safety.  With the widespread usage of cell
phones among all demographics and the inconclusive information on their
potential harm, the states have a substantial interest in minimizing the
potential risk.237 Tort suits against cell manufacturers will insure that this
risk is kept to the safest and most efficient levels possible.238
cell manufacturers would likely innovate to have the lowest possible SAR once the
standard was no longer preemptive.  Second, even if some phones could not be sold in
certain states, states often bar certain products that hinder health and safety. See, e.g.,
Katie Adams, Lake County Residents Learned Dangers of Alcoholic Energy Drinks,
ORLANDO SENTINEL (Dec. 14, 2010), http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2010-12-
14/news/os-lk-alcohol-caffeine-meeting-20101214_1_energy-drinks-phusion-projects-
alcoholic-beverages (discussing ban of Four Loko energy drink in five states); Penni
Crabtree, Illinois Is About to Adopt a Ban on Sale of Ephedra , SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB.,
May 17, 2003, at C1, available at http://legacy.utsandiego.com/news/business/20030517-
9999_1b17ephedra.html (citing several states considering bans on the drug ephedra);
Dave Weber, Fake Pot Banned in Seminole Schools, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Dec. 14,
2010), http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2010-12-14/news/os-seminole-school-fake-
marijuana-12120101214_1_fake-pot-synthetic-marijuana-synthetic-pot (discussing
several states’ ban of herbs laced with chemicals that mimic the effects of marijuana).
236 See Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 70 (2002).
237 See Semi-Annual Mid-Year 2012 Wireless Industry Survey, CTIA: THE WIRELESS
ASS’N 2 (2012), http://files.ctia.org/pdf/CTIA_Survey_MY_2012_Graphics-_final.pdf;
see also Victoria J. Rideout, Ulla G. Foehr & Donald F. Roberts, Generation M2, Media
in the Lives of 8- to 18-Year-Olds, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. 1-18 (Jan. 2010),
http://www.kff.org/entmedia/upload/8010.pdf.
238 See Wolf, supra note 106, at 294-95.
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[75] Factually, the argument for national uniformity that both the FCC
and cell phone companies have advanced is illusory, if not disingenuous.
Proponents of preemption argue that if states have widely varying SAR
standards, the national network will not function.239 However, even
without state regulations or tort suits, cell phones already have wildly
varying SARs with little impact on network functionality.240 Illustratively,
one of the phones with the lowest SAR is currently the Samsung Galaxy
Note.241 The Galaxy Note, a “smartphone,” has a SAR of 0.19 w/kg,
approximately one tenth of the FCC SAR standard.242 The phone
conducts all standard cell operations and has advanced capabilities such as
email and web browsing.243 The mere fact that a smartphone can interact
with the national network at such a low SAR severely undercuts the
argument that state tort suits will disrupt the national communications
network.
[76] Perhaps there is an argument that anything below 0.19 w/kg is
impossible to connect to the network.  If that is the case, then it can be
argued that Geier requires that any state tort suits demanding a SAR lower
than 0.19 w/kg should be barred by preemption.  However, absent such a
bottom minimum necessary SAR level, the courts should discard the
“national uniformity" argument as high in rhetoric and low in substantive
validity.
239 See, e.g., Murray, 982 A.2d at 775-77.
240 See infra notes 242–43 and accompanying text.
241 See Lynn La & Kent German, Cell Phone Radiation Levels, CNET (Oct. 29, 2012),
http://reviews.cnet.com/2719-6602_7-291-3.html.
242 See id.
243 See Liane Cassovoy, What Makes a Smartphone Smart? , ABOUT.COM,
http://cellphones.about.com/od/smartphonebasics/a/what_is_smart.htm (last visited Feb.
25, 2013).
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[77] Finally, the uniformity argument takes on a different meaning
when the “disunifying” force is not positive state regulation but tort suit
verdicts.  In other words, in order for multiple standards to be created, it
would require plaintiffs to bring suits against cell phone manufacturers
that prove that the SAR level of cell phones is unsafe.  If such cases are
brought successfully, that may indicate cell phones emitting current SAR
levels are unsafe for long-term use – a startling revelation.  A finding of
liability, therefore, may be a good proxy to demonstrate that the FCC
standard is deficient and should be amended.
B. Harmless Phones, Frivolous Suits, and Higher Consumer
Costs
[78] Another reasonable objection to allowing litigation against cell
phone manufacturers is that it is still unclear whether there are any
harmful effects.244 With the evidence inconclusive, cell phones could be
definitively proven to cause no harmful side effects.245 Furthermore, the
allowance of suits may lead to frivolous suits and manufacturers will
likely pass on their defense costs to consumers, resulting in higher priced
technology without any gain in safety (since they are already safe).246
Why, in the face of such uncertainty, should suits be allowed to
proceed?247
244 See generally INTERPHONE Study, supra note 76 (studying the potential adverse
effects of mobile phones).
245 See id.
246 See, e.g., Aaron O. Martin, Comment, The American Consumer Is Not Well: Where Is
Dr. Miles?, 47 WASHBURN L.J. 581, 603 (2008) (discussing how the cost of frivolous
lawsuits gets passed on to consumers in the form of increased product costs).
247 There is another strong argument that putting an agency in charge of safety is not
nearly as responsive to changing and advancing data as allowing tort suits to proceed
against companies and thus incentivize safety. See Wendy Wagner, When All Else Fails:
Regulating Risky Products Through Tort Litigation, 95 GEO. L.J. 693, 694-97 (2007).
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[79] The response to such criticism is that, unlike products that are used
by relatively few people, cell phones today are omnipresent.248 The risk of
harm, therefore, if the SAR standard is “wrong,” is staggering.
[80] Despite the potential costs to cell phone manufacturers and
consumers stemming from allowing litigation today, the potential
catastrophic downside—if cell phones cause harm in the long term—is
worth the utmost precaution today.
[81] Litigation will force cell phone manufacturers to constantly
reexamine their standards and have the status quo rigorously and
frequently tested through Daubert evidence fights and trials to juries.249
Many products that are ultimately proven to be safe go through the fire of
litigation and emerge on the other side vindicated.250 If such is the case
with cell phones, at least we can rest assured that the devices that sit in our
pockets and against our heads for our entire lives are doing as little harm
as possible.
VI. CONCLUSION
[82] The FCC SAR Standard is an important safety threshold, but it is
only a minimum standard.251 The standard is outdated and ignores the
increasingly recognized non-thermal effects of prolonged cell phone
248 See supra notes 101-02 (explaining that there are 292 million cell phone users in the
United States, including sixty-six percent of all teenagers).
249 See, e.g., Newman v. Motorola, Inc., 78 F. App’x 292, 293-94 (4th Cir. 2003).
250 See Wolf, supra note 106, at 268-72 (highlighting both Bendectin and breast implants
as products that were allegedly harmful, litigated, and found safe both in court and in
later scientific research).
251 See supra Part IV.A.
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radiation exposure.252 Suits based on these non-thermal effects should not
be barred by a standard that chose to ignore them.253
[83] The TCA was not intended to preempt state health and safety
objectives and courts should not read it to say as much, thereby removing
all remedies from those adversely affected by cell phones radiation.254
Broad readings of the preemptive effects of the TCA ignore the explicit
language to the contrary in the statute and by the FCC itself, regardless of
their changed position in recent amicus briefs.255
[84] Allowing cell phone suits to proceed to the merits will not impact
the “uniformity” of the national wireless network because as
demonstrated, SAR levels already vary widely within the maximum.256 In
fact, allowing such suits to proceed could act as a complement to the FCC
because a successful suit could demonstrate that enough evidence has been
mounted to warrant a reexamination of the SAR standard in light of non-
thermal effects (if that time has not already come).257 While the link
between cell phones and health problems is still not definitive, the risk of
future harm to hundreds of millions of people dwarfs the minimal addition
of precaution.258 When the stakes are so high, we should not accept
“inconclusive” as definitive proof that cell phones are safe.
252 See supra Part II.A.1.
253 See supra Part IV.
254 See supra Part II.A.2.
255 See supra Part IV.B.
256 See supra Part V.A.
257 See supra Part V.B.
258 See id.
